This article has one point that is well made and generally true: the media, and perhaps even the military itself, was a bit overzealous and too quick to ascribe a silver-bullet characterization to counterinsurgency (COIN) as preached by John Nagl, published in FM 3-24, and practiced by GEN Petraeus. However, this near-fanaticism should not discount the fact that it worked – at least as it was applied by GEN Petraeus in Iraq.
It is also true that the military itself was perhaps responsible for this buzz when it combined the rebirth of COIN with another reactivated (and retitled) technique used by the US government and military – Strategic Communications. It was an undoubtedly deliberate effort in which John Nagl took this concept to the media to achieve precisely the multitude of cognitive effects his blitz did indeed have. And why not? During this period, Americans were struggling to come to grips with the fact that not only might we NOT achieve some version of success in Iraq, but we might actually be thoroughly and decisively defeated – on the world stage no less. Certainly members of the military and their families felt no differently. The rediscovery and revitalization of COIN placed a necessary element of power back onto the table – the resurgence of national will. This resurgence of will was fanned by winds of hope, and these winds of hope were stirred by the concept of COIN. This probably explains the contemporary fanaticism regarding this topic at during this time.
Now, regarding COIN in general and its application elsewhere to include Afghanistan, it should be noted that COIN is not a strategy, but is at most an operational approach to a segment of warfare occurring within a theater of operation. It has no direct links to national objectives in and of itself. To imply that GEN McChrystal abandoned original thinking and all other methods of executing warfare and, as a direct result, failed to achieve national objectives is misguided at best and malicious at worst. Yes, it would have been a tragic mistake if he attempted to solely insert COIN into Afghanistan exactly as applied in Iraq, but this is not what he did. Operational cookie cutters do not exist, and I am certain GEN McChrystal was aware of this.
Your assertion, as expressed by a quote from COL Gentile, that the American strategy in Afghanistan is suddenly in tatters implies that this is something new. You imply that there actually was once a strategy in Afghanistan, but now it is lost. Furthermore, you imply that this loss of strategy is directly attributable to John Nagl, GEN McChrystal and GEN Petraeus. I am not convinced this is true. What I am certain of is that without clear, consistent and attainable political objectives set forth early and often in any conflict, military objectives, no matter how well developed and executed, are worthless.
-Major Joe Dzvonik, US Army
